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LIES WITHOUT LIARS? JANUS CAPITAL AND 
CONSERVATIVE SECURITIES JURISPRUDENCE 
DONALD C. LANGEVOORT

 
In Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders,
1
 the Supreme 
Court held that even if a mutual fund advisory firm had caused a lie about 
its late trading and market timing policies to appear in a prospectus issued 
by a mutual fund that it managed, it did not make a misrepresentation 
within the meaning of Rule 10b-5 because the prospectus in which the lie 
appeared was filed by and in the name of the mutual fund, not the adviser. 
According to the Court, the word “make” in Rule 10b-5 refers only to a 
statement by the person with ultimate legal authority over the filing and 
public dissemination of the document.
2
 In so holding, Justice Clarence 
Thomas and the rest of the majority joined a seemingly short list of judges 
who suggest that legal formalism is a particularly good weapon with 
which to fight securities fraud.  
To some, Janus may be just another float in the current Court’s 
tiresome pro-business parade, one that celebrates the Court’s contempt for 
securities class actions. But that impression may be unfair. Janus was one 
of three securities class action cases decided in 2011, the other two of 
which held for the plaintiffs in ways that disappointed those on the defense 
side. Matrixx Initiatives Inc. v. Siracusano,
3
 for instance, passed on an 
opportunity to rein in the otherwise fact-intensive approach to materiality 
on which defense motions to dismiss often stumble, and applied the 
heightened pleading requirement for scienter fairly liberally.  
Janus’s punch line is the “ultimate authority” test, but its defining 
image is the distinction between a speaker and a speechwriter
4
: Only the 
speaker, according to the Court, can reasonably be deemed the maker of 
any misrepresentation contained in the speech. Even if all the ideas, and 
even the exact language—including any deliberate deception—come from 
 
 
  Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. My 
thanks to Bob Thompson, Victoria Nourse, Adam Pritchard, Steve Thel, and commentators and 
participants at the ILEP conference in April 2012 and faculty workshops at Georgetown and the 
University of Utah, for helpful suggestions, and to Min Choi and Elaine Ellis for excellent research 
assistance. 
 1. 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011). 
 2. Id. at 2302. 
 3. 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011). The other pro-plaintiff outcome was Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. 
Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011) (holding that class certification does not require a finding that 
there was loss causation). 
 4. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302. 
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the speechwriter, she does not “make” the speech and thus is not primarily 
liable for the fraud.
5
 That means that we might well have deliberately 
deceptive speech with no liability at all under Rule 10b-5. The speaker 
does not know of or recklessly disregard the fraud, and thus has no 
scienter. The person acting with scienter is not the maker. So far as Rule 
10b-5 is concerned, we can have lies without liars.
6
 
This disconnect surely frustrates any purposive effort to fight securities 
fraud. There is nothing in the language or history of Rule 10b-5, a straight-
forward prohibition against securities fraud, to suggest that the SEC 
intended for its words to be limited so that the person or entity with the 
greatest causal responsibility for a misrepresentation or actionable 
omission escapes its reach. Janus leaves legal scholars and practicing 
lawyers to explain how the majority so confidently came to the conclusion 
that Rule 10b-5 means otherwise. 
Besides the purely political account noted earlier, a common 
explanation is that the Court simply failed to appreciate the unfortunate 
consequences of its rigid ruling, especially in the mutual fund context.
7
 
My argument is entirely different.
8
 The Janus opinion is a text woven 
from many different threads, including many made by the skilled appellate 
advocates who represented the business interests and knew particularly 
well how to resonate with the current Justices.
9
 Understanding the Court’s 
 
 
 5. The speaker-speechwriter distinction was offered initially in petitioner’s brief in the case. See 
Brief for Petitioners at 11, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (No. 
09-525), 2010 WL 3501188, at *11. In oral argument, Justice Scalia repeatedly invoked the 
speechwriter analogy. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative 
Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (No. 09-525), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/ 
argument_transcripts/09-525.pdf. 
 6. A similar point is made by Norman Poser, who criticizes Janus for tolerating a right without 
an effective remedy. See Norman S. Poser, The Supreme Court’s Janus Capital Case, 44 REV. SEC. & 
COMMOD. REG. 205 (2011). 
 7. See id.; see also Elizabeth Cosenza, Is the Third Time the Charm? Janus and the Proper 
Balance Between Primary and Secondary Actor Liability Under Section 10(b), 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1019 (2012). With respect to its understanding of how mutual funds work, see William A. Birdthistle, 
The Supreme Court’s Theory of the Fund, 37 J. Corp. L. 771 (2012). 
 8. Along similar lines, see A.C. Pritchard, Securities Law in the Roberts Court: Agenda or 
Indifference?, 37 J. CORP. L. 105, 135–38 (2011). 
 9. Petitioners were represented (quite effectively, obviously) by Mark Perry of Gibson, Dunn & 
Crutcher, who after law school at the University of Chicago clerked for Judge Alex Kozinski on the 
Ninth Circuit and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor on the Supreme Court. Mark A. Perry, GIBSON DUNN, 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/lawyers/mperry (last visited Oct. 1, 2012). For an exploration of the 
specialized Supreme Court bar, see Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the U.S. 
Supreme Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487 (2008). Lazarus 
shows that advocacy before the Supreme Court is increasingly in the hands of a relatively small 
number of specialists, and that—even though the political affiliations of the lawyers are on both 
sides—this expertise tilts strongly toward aiding business interests because the advocates’ firms do 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss3/9
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opinion requires that we willingly enter into the interpretive milieu of 
conservative public law jurisprudence. While the rough outlines of 
conservative thinking—textualism and strict interpretation—are familiar 
enough to most securities lawyers and academics, its nuances tend to be of 
little interest. Those who work entirely in the “private law” domain of 
corporate-securities law instinctively evaluate legal issues in terms of 
instrumental outcomes, asking what is best in terms of protecting 
investors, capital formation or some form of economic efficiency. 
Conservatism in this domain reflects the law and economics legacy that 
has influenced this field for the last three decades, with its strong 
preference for private ordering.
10
 Ideologically heated disagreements often 
arise about the law’s proper scope, but these remain debates ultimately 
about strategy. This instrumentalist form of conservatism is amply visible 
in recent case law interpreting Rule 10b-5. There are repeated references 
to unnecessary litigation and preserving the competitiveness of American 
business, which infuriates those who instinctively look to the courts to 
help advance the cause of investor protection.  
By contrast, Janus comes from an entirely different vision of legal 
analysis, where simply being against fraud is not enough. Genuine 
conservative interpretivism can be deliberately indifferent to policy 
effects; even seemingly absurd consequences may not necessarily be a 
reason to depart from a faithfully text-driven reading of a statute or rule.
11
 
This philosophy is about respecting strict separation of powers, 
appreciating the complexities of law-making, and preserving individual 
freedom and autonomy (economic and otherwise) absent legitimate 
governmental intervention.
12
 My aim here is not to take on any of the 
myriad contemporary public law debates about textualism as applied to 
administrative agency rulemaking, but instead simply to suggest that 
understanding decisions like Janus requires a different lens than the one 
securities academics and litigators normally use. By taking the 
 
 
extensive corporate work, and thus are commonly conflicted out from representing challengers. See id. 
at 1562. 
 10. The classic text is FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF CORPORATE LAW (Harvard Univ. Press 1996). 
 11. See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2003). Justice 
Scalia has written extensively on a conservative theory of interpretation, with a heavy emphasis on the 
dictionary, in ways that seem to describe much of the analysis in Janus. See generally ANTONIN 
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 
(Thomson/West 2012). Manning suggests that purposivism has declined as authority—and respect for 
text increased—even in the eyes of justices not entirely committed to the conservative view. See John 
F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 146–48.  
 12. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983). 
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conservative view more seriously, we might better understand how and 
why the case law has come to be as it is, and perhaps more importantly, 
anticipate other issues that are currently taken for granted but might 
similarly be contested. 
To this end, Part I analyzes Janus’s interpretive methodology, arguing 
that it is more persuasive even within a faithfully conservative textualist 
framework if read as addressing only the implied private right of action 
under Rule 10b-5, not SEC enforcement proceedings or criminal 
prosecutions. Part II then traces the route to Janus in terms of precedent—
both the more recent cases defining secondary liability and the early 
battles over the text of the “in connection with” requirement under Rule 
10b-5. It claims that there are underappreciated historical links between 
secondary liability and the “in connection with” language, and that Janus 
is likely to prompt a reexamination of the scope of that language, too, at 
least as applied in private litigation. Part III surveys the open questions 
that are being litigated after Janus, such as how to address liability where 
there is no obvious sense of “authority” over more informal corporate 
publicity, what scheme liability means apart from making particular 
misstatements, and how to address cases where the deception was not 
directly aimed at investors but instead targeted at other parties, such as 
auditors or independent directors on an audit committee. Part IV offers a 
brief conclusion. 
I. READING JANUS CAREFULLY 
The question presented in Janus was whether Janus Capital 
Management (JCM), an investment advisor, “made” a misrepresentation 
about the market timing and late trading policy that appeared in 
prospectuses issued and filed by Janus Investment Fund (JIF), which JCM 
was advising.
13
 Given that phrasing of the question, one would think that 
 
 
 13. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2299 (2011). These 
policies had to do with whether large investors would be given special privileges that might hurt fund 
performance (thereby harming JIF’s other investors) but increase the size of the fund (and hence 
JCM’s management fee, which is based on assets under management). See Stephen Choi & Marcel 
Kahan, The Market Penalty for Mutual Fund Scandals, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1021 (2007). According to 
plaintiffs, JCM administered this policy, and so would be the only party with direct knowledge of the 
truthfulness of the statements in the prospectus. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2312 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In 
the typical mutual fund setting, the advisor does all the day-to-day work of managing the fund; the 
fund itself has an independent board of directors (or, as here, board of trustees) whose job it is, for all 
practical purposes, to oversee the adviser. Id. To be clear, defendants contested that JCM controlled 
the preparation of the prospectus, even though in-house lawyers employed by JCM did the drafting, 
emphasizing that the board of trustees of JIF met to review the filing and were represented by separate 
independent counsel in the review process. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss3/9
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the lawsuit here was being brought by JIF investors who said they relied to 
their detriment on the falsity.
14
 Instead, and essential to a critical reading 
of the opinion, this was a “fraud-on-the-market” class action brought by 
investors in a separate legal entity, Janus Capital Group (JCG), JCM’s 
publicly-traded parent company, after JCM was sanctioned by federal and 
state authorities for breach of fiduciary duty in the well-publicized market 
timing scandals of the mid-2000s.
15
 The penalties and attendant 
reputational damage from its subsidiary’s behavior caused JCG’s stock 
price to drop, for which the class-period purchasers wanted 
compensation.
16
  
Plaintiffs’ claim was based on the failure by JCG to reveal JCM’s 
misconduct and the threat that it posed. Yet under the securities laws, there 
is no automatic duty to reveal cheating or other fiduciary breaches simply 
because of their materiality.
17
 So, the plaintiffs had to look for affirmative 
misstatements that might have been made materially misleading by the 
omission of the cheating. The plaintiffs came up empty with respect to 
JCG’s own public disclosures, but did find what they believed were 
misleading statements in the JIF prospectuses.
18
 
The core of plaintiffs’ fraud-on-the-market argument was that what 
was stated in JIF’s mutual fund prospectuses distorted the market price of 
JCG securities. This was something of a stretch. To be sure, if the 
prospectus had revealed JCM’s inclination to allow market timing by 
favored fund investors, there might have been unfavorable publicity and 
an adverse price effect. But since neither JIF nor JCM had an explicit duty 
to reveal these intentions, liability could have been avoided simply by 
silence or vagueness. Plaintiffs were thus fortunate to find something in a 
document for which they were not the intended beneficiaries—otherwise 
they would have had no case under Rule 10b-5, even assuming the market 
timing misbehavior occurred. The Janus Court likely sensed that there was 
some overreaching by the plaintiffs, which could well have affected how it 
viewed the ultimate question of who “made” the statements in the JIF 
 
 
 14. In fact, such an action was brought and settled. Before the Court, defendants acknowledged 
that JIF shareholders had a legitimate cause of action because, as the district court found, JCM had an 
independent fiduciary disclosure duty owed at least indirectly to JIF’s shareholders. See Transcript of 
Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 64. 
 15. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2300. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 653–56 (6th 
ed. 2009); Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: 
Reflections on Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 879 (2003). 
 18. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2300. 
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disclosures. This was hardly the ideal factual scenario, from the 
perspective of the plaintiffs’ bar, for testing the limits of primary liability. 
In other work, I have stressed that the presumption of reliance that 
supports the fraud-on-the-market theory is an entitlement—an act of 
juristic grace
19—afforded to investors in order to promote the truth-telling 
goals of the securities laws. But any such entitlement goes only as far as 
courts think is necessary or just. One can easily see how the Court might 
doubt both the necessity and justice of creating massive liability where the 
alleged misstatements were directed at an entirely different group of 
investors than the ones bringing suit, especially when the prospectus 
appeared to reflect the sincere (if inaccurate) belief on the part of JIF’s 
independent directors that the anti-timing redemption policy statements 
were true. This was the odd context in which Janus was decided, which 
was heavily stressed by JCM’s counsel at oral argument.20  
Janus has to be read as a fraud-on-the-market case, with all the 
baggage that such a cause of action implies. That takes us to the biggest 
mystery about the Court’s opinion. The opinion concentrates on a single 
word—“make”—in Rule 10b-5(b), and, as such, appears to be interpreting 
the Rule itself. If this is right, then the Court is defining that word for all 
cases invoking that subsection, whether brought by a private plaintiff, the 
SEC, or a criminal prosecutor. Yet the Court explicitly framed the 
question before it as “whether JCM can be held liable in a private action” 
under Rule 10b-5.
21
 The Court’s interpretive methodology then repeatedly 
invokes the (fairly recent) directive that the courts are to “give ‘narrow 
dimensions . . . to a right of action Congress did not authorize when it first 
enacted the statute and did not expand when it revisited the law.’”22 And it 
refuses to defer to the SEC’s reading of the word “make” because of the 
Court’s “skepticism over the degree of” deference owed “regarding the 
private right of action.”23 So is the Court construing the Rule, or just the 
right of action?  
 
 
 19. See Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. 
REV. 151, 161. 
 20. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 5. 
 21. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2301 (emphasis added). 
 22. Id. at 2302 (emphasis added) (alterations in original).  
 23. Id. at 2303 n.8 (emphasis added). This is especially important because, traditionally, the 
Court has readily deferred to the SEC’s own construal of the language of Rule 10b-5 outside the 
private litigation context, assuming reasonableness in light of the statutory grant of authority. See SEC 
v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819–20 (2002). There is an emerging issue in administrative law about the 
validity of such deference (often referred to as “Auer” deference, after Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 
(1997)) where the agency’s interpretation arises outside of (or inconsistently with) the process by 
which rulemaking is expected to occur—in other words, concern about using interpretation as a de 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss3/9
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Many lower courts have applied Janus to SEC enforcement actions, at 
least “arguendo.”24 Some historical background is important. In two prior 
Supreme Court cases involving different aspects of Rule 10b-5, Central 
Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank
25
 and Morrison v. National 
Australia Bank,
26
 similarly restrictive decisions were quickly followed by 
Congressional determinations to leave untouched the Court’s rulings as 
applied to private litigation but to reestablish the SEC’s broader 
enforcement authority.
27
 Reading cases like these as not limited to private 
litigation, notwithstanding extensive language in the opinion to the 
contrary, may be becoming a habit. 
If Janus is an authoritative reading of Rule 10b-5’s text, however, its 
analysis is disturbing. The Court essentially offers four reasons for its 
narrow construction of “make.” The first justification is a brief reference 
to the dictionary,
28
 which is not particularly helpful because the word has 
so many possible meanings.
29
 The second is the Court’s own common 
sense or ordinary usage of the term, from which comes the speaker-
speechwriter distinction.
30
 The third is precedent—interpretive guidance 
 
 
facto amendment to a rule. It is hard to see the relevance of this debate to a case like Janus, given that 
the Commission was offering an entirely plausible, if not inevitable, reading of a word of its own 
choosing. That said, Justice Thomas—implausibly—claims that the meaning of “make” was not 
ambiguous as a way of avoiding deference. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303 n.8. 
 24. E.g., SEC v. Landberg, 836 F. Supp. 2d 148 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 
340 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). But see SEC v. Boock, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 96,584 at *3 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (“Wong also does not explain why Janus Capital, which found that the wording of the relevant 
statutes did not permit private actors to sue those who may be liable for misstatements of others in 
violation of Rule 10b-5, has any bearing on the SEC’s capacity to sue secondary violators . . . .”); SEC 
v. Pentagon Capital Mgmt. PLC, 844 F. Supp. 2d 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (language in Janus specifically 
directed at private litigation, not the SEC). SEC Commissioner Elisse Walter discussed Janus critically 
in a speech without contesting its application to the Commission’s enforcement work. See 
Commissioner Elisse Walter, Remarks Before the FINRA Institute at Wharton Certified Regulatory 
and Compliance Professional Program (Nov. 8, 2011). An SEC administrative law judge applied Janus 
in In re John Flannery, Initial Dec., Oct. 28, 2011, available at http://www.sec.gov/alj/aljdec/2011/id 
438bpm.pdf.  
 25. 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (holding that private plaintiffs could not maintain an aiding and abetting 
suit under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act).  
 26. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). Morrison applied a “presumption against extraterritoriality” to hold 
that Rule 10b-5 does not apply to transactions occurring outside the borders of the United States. 
 27. See Section 20(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (creating 
explicit aiding and abetting authority) and Section 27(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(b) (granting government 
broader extraterritorial jurisdiction). 
 28. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302. 
 29. This is a familiar criticism of strong-form textualism, even from within conservative theory. 
See Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 2012), 
available at http://www.tnr.com/article/magazine/books-and-arts/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-
law-textual-originalism?page=0,0; Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 391–93 
(2005).  
 30. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302. 
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drawn from Central Bank and the Court’s more recent decision in 
Stoneridge.
31
 The fourth is the need to confine implied rights of action.
32
  
Note what the Court does not do—ask what a reasonable person would 
think the SEC meant at the time by its chosen language.
33
 The context in 
which the rule was adopted is well-known.
34
 Until 1942, the SEC had 
relied on Section 17(a) of the Securities Act in fraud cases. Section 17(a) 
bars fraud and misrepresentation in the “offer or sale” of a security. But 
the agency had recently uncovered a case of fraud by a buyer of securities, 
not a seller, and was not sure that 17(a) would bar the on-going conduct.
35
 
The Commission plugged the gap by modifying the language of 17(a) to 
apply to buyer fraud, in the form of a rule adopted pursuant to Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. The second prong of 17(a) included 
a prohibition against “obtaining money or property by means of” a 
material misrepresentation or omission. Without any explanation, the 
drafters of Rule 10b-5 chose the simpler word “make” in crafting the 
desired symmetry.  
That is not a trivial bit of history. Consider if the SEC had brought a 
case under Section 17(a) against JCM. The question would be whether 
JCM was obtaining money or property by means of a misrepresentation or 
actionable omission. There is a compelling textual argument that that is 
exactly what it was doing. JCM was allowing the late trading by favored 
investors to inflate its management fee,
36
 and it was doing so by causing 
the false impression, in JIF’s prospectuses, that such trading was not being 
allowed. “By means of” seems quite well suited to catch this sort of 
deception. If that is right, however, then what the Court is effectively 
saying in Janus is that “make” was meant by the SEC to have a more 
restrictive meaning than what was in the statutory text from which the 
Rule was drawn. That is implausible given the context of the Rule’s 
adoption. More likely, the drafters chose “make” in order to avoid the 
unnecessary complications of having to prove motive in fraud cases, while 
remaining at least as expansive and flexible as the original statutory 
 
 
 31. Id. at 2302–03. 
 32. Id. at 2303. 
 33. Nor does the Court defer to the SEC’s interpretation of its own word. See supra note 23. 
 34. See Milton V. Freeman, Colloquium Foreword: Happy Birthday Rule 10b-5, 61 FORDHAM L. 
REV. S1 (1993) (recollections of rule’s principal drafter). 
 35. Id. at S1–S2. 
 36. On the applicability of Janus in Section 17(a) cases, see infra Part III.A. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss3/9
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language, because serious damage can be done by misrepresentations even 
when there is no overt intention to obtain money or property.
37
  
Having failed to make any inquiry into the context of the Rule’s 
adoption, the Court then goes on for much of the remainder of the opinion 
to invoke the policy goal of confining private litigation.
38
 Once again, 
originalism is ignored, because that policy could not have had any 
usefulness at the time the SEC’s words were written. There was no private 
litigation under Rule 10b-5 until years after its adoption.
39
 Unless Janus is 
read as limited to private actions, the Court is giving policy-based 
meaning to a word that could not possibly have contemplated that policy 
when it was written by the SEC in 1942. This sort of interpretation usually 
provokes loud conservative protest.
40
 On the other hand, the holding is 
perfectly coherent if read as limited to private actions. The SEC has never 
been deemed authoritative on the scope of the judicially implied right of 
action under Section 10(b), and restraining the scope of the implied right 
has been a judicial mission for almost two decades. 
For all these reasons, and notwithstanding a brief footnote reference to 
textual unambiguity in the course of explaining why it was giving the SEC 
no interpretive deference,
41
 I prefer to take the Court’s statement of its 
holding literally: we are being told what “make” means in the context of 
private securities litigation under Rule 10b-5, leaving open how it is to be 
construed in the context of public enforcement. This is not an insignificant 
matter, though it might not be all that important in the particular context of 
Janus. Worth noting, though unmentioned in the Court’s opinion, is that 
the SEC did take enforcement action against JCM in 2004, which settled.
42
 
 
 
 37. It is, however, the conclusion in one pre-Janus case, SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436 (1st Cir. 
2010) (en banc). The court accepts a broader reading of Section 17(a), but then cannot identify a 
reason why the SEC substituted “make” for “by means of” other than to impose a different, narrower 
meaning. Id. That latter inference seems quite strained given the simple desire to expand the reach of 
the antifraud prohibition through the adoption of Rule 10b-5. Two of the six First Circuit judges 
concurred in this result, but seemed to distance themselves from some of their colleagues’ literalism. 
Id. at 450. Two other judges dissented. Id. at 453. 
 38. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303. 
 39. See COX ET AL., supra note 17, at 662–63. Similarly, it would be strange to construe the word 
“make” in light of the teachings of Central Bank and Stoneridge, neither of which involved the use of 
that word. Here again, the interpretive methodology makes more sense as to the scope of the private 
right of action for misstatements made by a defendant, which those two cases plainly addressed. 
 40. One is tempted to suggest that the real technique of statutory interpretation at work here is a 
simple presumption against a statute’s reach. See Easterbrook, supra note 12. For an analysis of 
Morrison, as disguising a particularly activist form of statutory interpretation, see Lea Brilmayer, The 
New Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Legislative Supremacy, and the 
Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 40 SW. U. L. REV. 655 (2011). 
 41. See supra note 23. 
 42. See In re Janus Capital Mgmt., Rel. No. IA-2277, Aug. 18, 2004.  
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The complaint did not invoke Rule 10b-5 at all. Instead, the claims were 
all brought under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, with its distinctive 
antifraud prohibition, and the Investment Company Act of 1940.
43
 The 
Commission’s action claims that JCM actually filed the misleading 
prospectuses for JIF
44—a fact that was particularly important to the 
plaintiffs’ case in Janus, but which the majority ignores. 
That takes us to a final, perhaps obvious, introductory point. If, 
contrary to my reading, the Court was construing the SEC’s chosen 
wording, then the Commission can reverse Janus simply by amending 
Rule 10b-5 to be clearer about its meaning, assuming that it stays faithful 
to the statutory grant of rulemaking authority in Section 10(b).
45
 That may 
be the Court’s goal here, invoking something akin to a penalty default 
interpretation, like contra proferentem in contract law, simply to provoke 
the Commission or Congress to clarify its intent through an amendment to 
Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5. In this regard, Janus bears a substantial 
affinity to both Central Bank and Morrison, both of which did provoke a 
congressional response.
46
 Such a penalty default reading would lead us 
into relatively new territory in the law of statutory (or administrative rule) 
interpretation, though it is not all that far removed from the conservative 
vision of separation of powers that insists that the legislature step up and 
take responsibility for hard policy choices.
47
 
On the other hand, if Janus is just about the scope of liability in the 
implied right of action, the message is entirely different. While there is 
some debate about the SEC’s authority with respect to private rights,48 the 
 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. ¶ 21.  
 45. Adam Pritchard sees the presence of the twin Section 20 provisions as impediments to the 
Commission’s freedom here. See Pritchard, supra note 8, at 137. I am less convinced, but the point is 
well taken. On the text and history of Congress’ broad grant of authority in Section 10(b), see Steve 
Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385 
(1990). 
 46. See Section 20(e) of the Securities Exchange Act (giving the SEC the ability to pursue aiding 
and abetting cases), and Section 27(b) of the Securities Exchange Act (giving the SEC broader 
extraterritorial jurisdiction). 
 47. There is scholarly literature addressing the use of these kinds of strategies in statutory 
interpretation. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2162 (2002); Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Penalty Default Canon, 72 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 663 (2004); see also Nelson, supra note 29, at 391–93 (describing use of formalist interpretive 
rules as a means of facilitating clearer communication between Congress and the courts). At oral 
argument in Janus, counsel for petitioners opened with the point that Congress has consistently 
responded to prior Court decisions when it wished to change the law—the only argument he was able 
to make before questions began. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 3.  
 48. See generally, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the 
Federal Securities Laws, 107 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1994). 
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impression given by the Court here and in other recent cases is that the 
responsibility to adopt a new private litigation standard if it wishes is for 
Congress, not the SEC.
49
 Although legislative expansion of private rights 
is unlikely to happen in the current political environment, that prediction is 
of no concern to judges who care more about limiting the scope of judicial 
authority than optimal investor protection. 
II. THE ROAD TO JANUS 
A. Central Bank and Stoneridge 
Justice Thomas’s majority opinion in Janus justifies a narrow reading 
of “make” as implicit in two prior decisions dealing with the secondary 
liability question under Rule 10b-5: Central Bank of Denver v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver and the more recent Stoneridge Investment 
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.
50
 Justice Breyer’s dissent shows 
the hollowness of Thomas’s argument based on precedent. He notes that 
Central Bank was entirely about aiding and abetting (which the Court 
rejected), as distinct from the kind of primary liability claim being made in 
Janus,
51
 and that Stoneridge was solely about how private plaintiffs 
demonstrate reliance on an alleged misrepresentation, which says nothing 
at all about primary liability.
52
  
I have nothing much to add to Breyer’s point about Central Bank. 
Stoneridge deserves more emphasis, however, because it was such a 
surprising turn in the law. Observers thought that Stoneridge would at last 
address the standard for primary liability and choose from the various 
tests—attribution, creator, substantial participant—developed by lower 
courts to deal with the question left open after Central Bank. Attribution 
was the odds-on, defendant-friendly favorite. It required that the victim of 
the fraud be able to attribute the misleading statement to the particular 
defendant, thereby insulating most behind-the-scenes actors from 
liability.
53
 
 
 
 49. As will be discussed infra, the Commission could work within Janus’s framework to expand 
liability by requiring more public certifications of filings by significant behind the scenes actors, like 
mutual fund advisors. 
 50. 552 U.S. 148 (2008). 
 51. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2307–08 (2011) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 52. Id. at 2309. 
 53. See, e.g., Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1998). For a review of 
various formulations, see COX ET AL., supra note 17, at 769–72.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
944 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:933 
 
 
 
 
The surprise was that the Stoneridge Court addressed the issue before it 
in terms of reliance instead of primary liability, holding that plaintiffs 
cannot show reliance on deception that is too remote or attenuated from 
the ultimate public misrepresentations.
54
 A prime mover behind this shift 
appears to have been the Solicitor General (SG), who presumably has an 
interest in protecting government enforcement actions, civil and criminal, 
from an overly restrictive reading of Rule 10b-5. Public enforcers are not 
required to prove reliance in a 10b-5 case, and so the shift to reliance had 
the effect of making the case one solely about private litigation. It is hard 
to imagine any other reason for not treating the case as raising the more 
palpable issue of whether the defendants (Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola) 
had themselves made the misrepresentations on which plaintiffs say they 
relied.  
The SG’s brief in Stoneridge is worth revisiting.55 The plaintiff 
community remembers it as political anathema: a last-minute repudiation 
by the Bush Administration of the SEC’s decision to file a brief on the 
plaintiffs’ side in that case. However, the first portion of the SG’s brief is a 
remarkably plaintiff-friendly effort to defend Rule 10b-5 from the Eighth 
Circuit’s oddly narrow reading of deception through non-verbal acts. After 
explaining why non-verbal deception is well within the scope of the Rule’s 
coverage, the brief argues that what the defendant vendors did was a form 
of deception directly prohibited by Section 10(b): their obfuscation and 
falsifications misled the issuer’s auditor and others who were not in on the 
scheme. In the SG’s words, defendants’ conduct “constituted a ‘deceptive 
device or contrivance’ . . . . because [it] not only was likely to, but 
allegedly did, mislead Charter’s outside accountant, Arthur Andersen, into 
believing that the two sets of transactions [at issue in the fraud] were 
discrete.”56 The brief then explains why this interpretation of Section 10(b) 
is entirely consistent with Central Bank.
57
 Only after giving this wider 
scope to primary liability did the government then switch sides and 
support the defendants by arguing lack of actionable reliance. 
 
 
 54. See Donald C. Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge Carefully: A Duty Based Approach to 
Reliance and Third Party Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2125 (2010). The case 
involved public misrepresentations by an issuer (Charter) that, according to plaintiffs, were enabled by 
false statements and invoices made by two set-top box manufacturers (Scientific-Atlanta and 
Motorola), ultimately reflected in Charter’s financial reports. 
 55. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, Stoneridge 
Investment Partners LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta Inc., No. 06–43 (2007). The Solicitor General at the 
time was Paul Clement. 
 56. Id. at 16–17. 
 57. Id. at 14–15. 
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The Court in Stoneridge agreed with the government’s argument about 
non-verbal deception without taking the further step of holding that what 
the vendors did was deceptive vis-à-vis the independent auditors.
58
 But the 
Solicitor General had styled the argument over what deception means in a 
way faithful to conservative orthodoxy. The argument is perfectly 
textualist in its treatment of Congress’ grant of rulemaking authority; 
indeed, the fact that the entire argument is grounded in the wording of 
Section 10(b) rather than Rule 10b-5 is, I suspect, lost on many readers.  
One therefore has to wonder why the plaintiffs in Janus didn’t follow 
the SG’s lead in Stoneridge and argue that JCM made a misrepresentation 
(or actionable omission) to JIF and its independent directors when it 
provided the information regarding timing policy and failed to reveal its 
true intentions.
59
 That would constitute a 10b-5 violation so long as the 
deception was “in connection with the purchase or sale of a security,” 
which is generally thought to be satisfied if the misstatement was 
“reasonably calculated” to influence investors.60 Such would seem to be 
the case in Janus, since the information was made part of a statutory 
prospectus for mutual fund investors, and investors relied on that 
deception.
61
 If that alternative styling of plaintiffs’ claim in Janus would 
be enough to avoid Justice Thomas’s holding, then maybe the case is not 
so troubling—a harsh outcome due to a strategic error by the plaintiffs and 
their lawyers.  
What would happen if a court were to accept this alternative pleading 
of the 10b-5 claim in a private class action? Assuming the other elements 
are properly alleged, then the issue becomes one of reliance, just like in 
Stoneridge. The test that Justice Kennedy uses in Stoneridge asks whether 
the plaintiffs’ reliance is “too remote” or too “attenuated” from the lie to 
justify recovery,
62
 akin to a proximate cause inquiry. He explains that the 
vendors’ lies in the form of bogus invoices, etc. were too remote and 
attenuated because these vendors were merely commercial actors. They 
were not part of the securities business and had never had the sort of 
 
 
 58. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 1478, 158 (2008). 
 59. The issue was addressed by JCM in both the brief and oral argument, stressing simply that 
the plaintiffs had failed to plead the case this way, and that any effort to recover by JCG investors 
would fail because of lack of duty. 
 60. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). The “reasonably calculated” standard comes from SEC v. 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 61. The Solicitor General’s brief in Stoneridge took no position with respect to the “in 
connection with” requirement. 
 62. Stoneridge, 522 U.S. at 159, 162.  
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involvement in, much less control over, the issuer’s financial reporting 
process to make the fraud “necessary or inevitable.”63  
Were that same standard applied in Janus, one could see an easy way 
of distinguishing Stoneridge on its facts and hence a strong argument in 
favor of the plaintiffs.
64
 JCM had practical control over JIF’s disclosures, 
particularly as to the market timing practices over which it had exclusive 
knowledge. After all, letting late trading and market timing occur is at the 
adviser’s (and the affiliated brokers’) discretion. Moreover, these were 
registered investment advisers, inhabiting a world of intense federal and 
state regulation, rather than commercial salespeople. As a matter of 
proximate cause, the link between the JCM’s alleged lie and the resulting 
disclosure was tightly coupled, if there was any appreciable distance at all. 
Janus, then, could actually be read as inconsistent with the analytical 
structure of Stoneridge, and making its analysis meaningless if applied 
such that actors like the set-top vendors in that case never even “made” a 
misstatement in the first place. Justice Kennedy joined the majority in 
Janus; however, it is unclear whether he realized that his very different 
and more nuanced opinion in Stoneridge was quickly being rendered 
superfluous.  
B. A Longer History 
There is no compelling explanation for the outcome in Janus by 
reference to contemporary precedent. But tracing the conservative impulse 
further back in time as it applies to these issues under Rule 10b-5 may 
better explain the holding.  
The idea that federal courts erred in recognizing liability for aiding and 
abetting gained intellectual currency in 1981 when Daniel Fischel 
suggested so in a law review article,
65
 which the Court explicitly relied 
 
 
 63. Id. at 161. 
 64. For a discussion of this potential in Stoneridge, see Langevoort, supra note 54, at 2161–65. 
To be sure, lower courts after Stoneridge did not take up this potential, largely sticking closely to the 
attribution standard. E.g., In re DVI Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623 (3d Cir. 2011); Pacific Inv. Mgmt. 
Co. v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2010). Although Janus clearly embraces a strong 
version of an attribution requirement, it is in the context of answering whether JCM bore responsibility 
for what JIF said in its prospectuses. It avoids addressing the indirect fraud possibility. Janus, 131 S. 
Ct. at 2304 n.9 (“We do not address whether and in what circumstances statements [such as those from 
JCM to JIF] would qualify as ‘public.’”). Clearly, however (and unfortunately), the window for a 
measured reading of Stoneridge seems to be closing. 
 65. Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 69 CAL. L. REV. 80 (1981). Fischel clearly draws from prior work by his then-Dean, David S. 
Ruder, whose exploration of secondary liability anticipated many of these points. See David S. Ruder, 
Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, 
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upon a little more than a decade later in Central Bank.
66
 The article repays 
careful attention, partly because it bears little evidence of the sophisticated 
law and economics on which Fischel was contemporaneously working 
(and which would soon mark his collaboration with Frank Easterbrook at 
the University of Chicago).
67
 The article begins with the blunt claim that 
the Supreme Court had repudiated the justification for implied private 
rights of action generally, whether under the securities laws or otherwise.
68
 
While the Court was allowing the implied right under Rule 10b-5 to 
remain for a variety of pragmatic reasons, Fischel treats it as if it were a 
jurisprudential bastard, the surviving illegitimate child of judicial activism. 
Hence, Fischel perceives the need to confine the implied right to a 
carefully limited space unless and until Congress creates an express right, 
regardless of policy arguments for or against the public’s interest in 
compensation or deterrence in the meantime.
69
  
The core of Fischel’s law review argument was that the text of Section 
10(b) limits the scope of Rule 10b-5,
70
 and that only tangible evidence of 
legislative intent to create liability could justify recovery beyond the strict 
confines of the words in the statute.
71
 Legislative silence or inaction in the 
face of opportunity to address an issue means that there is no statutory 
reach, unless there is a clear direction to the administering agency to fill 
the gap. So, he argued that three widely embraced doctrines—aiding and 
abetting, conspiracy, and respondeat superior—had to go even if the core 
of antifraud liability survived.
72
  
Fischel then addressed whether those doctrines had to be excised even 
as to SEC enforcement, for which there is express statutory authority. Yes, 
 
 
Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597, 620 (1972) (“Abolition of the privity 
requirement makes the potential damage for a secondary defendant greater, and emphasizes that 
careful attention should be given to identification of the elements required for secondary liability.”). 
Ruder, however, was more interested in reining in secondary liability than dismissing it as illegitimate, 
presumably because he was writing in the day when implied rights were still being embraced without 
question. For a tribute to Ruder’s influence, see Douglas M. Branson, Prescience and Vindication: 
Federal Courts, SEC Rule 10b-5, and the Work of David S. Ruder, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 613 (1991). 
 66. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 169. 
 67. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 10. 
 68. Fischel, supra note 65, at 91. 
 69. While it may seem odd that Fischel was at the same time fervently embracing fraud-on-the-
market litigation, that is somewhat more understandable when seen as a way of transferring decision-
making power from unruly judges and juries to experts in econometrics, who could satisfactorily 
resolve the hard issues of materiality, reliance, and causation. See Langevoort, supra note 19, at 178–
79. He thought the volume of cases would drop considerably as a result. 
 70. Fischel, supra note 65, at 94. 
 71. Id. at 98. 
 72. Id. at 102. 
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he said,
73
 because a corollary of the conservative approach is structuralist 
restraint: when Congress has addressed an issue somewhere in the statute, 
the political choices made therein should not be upset by inventiveness 
elsewhere, particularly when courts are doing the inventing.
74
 Fischel 
stressed that Congress came to a highly political but nonetheless 
dispositive conclusion about when—and when not—to impose liability on 
secondary actors in Section 20(a).
75
  
We can debate the accuracy of Fischel’s history with respect to Section 
20,
76
 but his idea comes through clearly enough in Janus. For all practical 
purposes, the plaintiffs were arguing that JCM controlled JIF’s prospectus 
disclosures. If so, Fischel would say—as Justice Thomas does—that 
Section 20 is the right place to look for whether or not to impose liability. 
In other words, courts should not recognize any direct liability under Rule 
10b-5 that might frustrate the political compromise over secondary 
liability that Justice Thomas finds evident in this portion of the statute. A 
Fischel adherent would thus reject Justice Breyer’s dissent, which says 
that we should dismiss Section 20(a) because it will not produce liability 
unless someone else is primarily liable, as missing the point. 
I am not at all persuaded by Fischel’s line of reasoning, however. There 
is a big difference between having control over a violator and deliberately 
causing a violation, and the latter fits snugly enough within Section 
10(b)’s entirely distinct textual grant of rulemaking authority. But the 
conservative impulse does not rest entirely on the shadow of Section 20 as 
a reason to be suspicious of the plaintiffs’ argument in Janus. The 
statutory requirement that any deception be “in connection with” the 
purchase or sale of a security is another sore spot. The ambiguity in this 
phrase is palpable: does the need to connect the fraud to a securities 
transaction mean that the defendant must have been buying or selling, or 
can it be something broader? The Second Circuit, in SEC v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Co.,
77
 famously stressed the latter in the late 1960s, and 
established the test that is still used today. The court held that any 
misstatement or omission violates Rule 10b-5 if it is “reasonably 
 
 
 73. Fischel, supra note 65, at 99–100. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Fischel emphasizes that original language for secondary participants was broader but this 
effort was resisted by the business community, leading to the language of Section 20 as a political 
compromise. Id. at 98–99.  
 76. See infra note 117 and accompanying text; Robert A. Prentice, Conceiving the Inconceivable 
and Judicially Implementing the Preposterous: The Premature Demise of Respondeat Superior 
Liability Under Section 10(b), 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325 (1997). 
 77. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). 
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calculated” to influence investors, regardless of whether or not the 
defendant is itself trading.
78
 The Second Circuit’s language led directly to 
the invention of the fraud-on-the-market class action. But while a total 
abandonment of privity won the day, it frustrated conservative critics 
because it created a tort-like remedy that could be invoked by nearly 
anyone.
79
 Fischel expresses this “in connection with” frustration briefly in 
his article,
80
 though his affection for the fraud-on-the-market theory 
probably caused him to hold back a bit. In explaining why aiding and 
abetting is illegitimate, he points out that the kinds of persons sued under 
Rule 10b-5, bankers and lawyers, for example, are usually persons who 
are not themselves engaged in the purchase or sale of a security.
81
  
A clear judicial expression of the conservative antipathy came later on 
from the dissenters in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the Supreme Court’s 1988 
endorsement of fraud-on-the-market.
82
 We tend to remember Justice 
White’s dissent, which was joined in by Justice O’Connor, for its 
skepticism about market efficiency as a justification for a presumption of 
reliance.
83
 But in the midst of this invective, the two dissenters said 
explicitly that the better course of action might well have been to repudiate 
Texas Gulf Sulphur entirely, as at least one amicus party was urging.
84
 
 
 
 78. Id. at 862. That was soon followed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Superintendent of 
Insurance of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971)—perhaps the height of tort-
style reasoning, in a way that made the “in connection with” requirement almost an afterthought. For 
an exploration, see James D. Cox, Fraud is in the Eyes of the Beholder: Rule 10b-5’s Application to 
Corporate Mismanagement, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 674 (1972).  
 79. David Ruder’s view here about the dangers associated with the abandonment of privity 
reflects this same unease. See David S. Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur—The Second Round: Privity and 
State of Mind in Rule 10b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 NW. U. L. REV. 423 (1968). For earlier 
work, see David S. Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 
57 NW. U. L. REV. 627 (1963). Ruder was later appointed Chairman of the SEC by President Reagan. 
 80. See Fischel, supra note 65, at 108 n.153. 
 81. Id. at 101. In drafting the opinion in the seminal case of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 
U.S. 185 (1976), Justice Powell apparently considered raising doubts about the abandonment of privity 
particularly because of its effects on third-party liability, but ultimately only included a footnote about 
“policy questions” that supported the scienter requirement. Id. at 216 n.33; see A.C. Pritchard, Justice 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 
868–69 (2003). 
 82. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 83. Id. at 254 (White, J., concurring). 
 84. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 261 (1988). Justice Thomas himself displayed a 
suspicion about the statutory “in connection with” requirement in United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 
642 (1997), a criminal insider-trading case. He wrote at length about how the law firm partner’s 
misappropriation, even if seen as deceptive and done for the purpose of enabling trading, was not itself 
a purchase or sale and so could not legitimately satisfy the in connection with standard. Id. at 682–90 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). His dissent is a zealous claim for a very strict construction of the nexus 
language. 
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This incipient conservative revisionism resurfaced in the Stoneridge 
litigation. A number of amici on the defense side wanted the Court to rule 
against the plaintiffs on the “in connection with” requirement.85 The 
amici’s strong stance in favor of a standard requiring “coincidence” 
between the fraud and the purchase or sale was mystifying to anyone who 
simply assumed Texas Gulf Sulphur was good law. Perhaps persuaded by 
the Solicitor General, the Court found it unnecessary to revisit the 
question.
86
 But the Court’s twice-emphasized observation that holding 
vendors who inhabit the world of commerce and do not in any way engage 
in buying or selling securities to Section 10(b) liability would be 
inappropriate
87
 was precisely the point that conservatives had been making 
for forty years. 
To be sure, the “in connection with” issue is nowhere to be seen in 
Janus. But it would have been present had plaintiffs tried the alternative 
theory, discussed earlier, that JCM had deceived JIF and its directors. And, 
I suspect that Justice Thomas’s instinct was that liability under Section 
10(b) should be tightly confined (if not erased) when the defendant in 
question is not itself buying or selling. If so, his “ultimate authority” test 
achieves technical precision—at least here—because JIF was the sole 
seller of the securities to which the misleading prospectus related. And to 
the extent that the test’s effect is to narrow primary 10b-5 liability to a 
smaller class of actors in the securities markets, it nudges the law back in 
the direction of privity and so undoes some of Texas Gulf Sulphur’s 
perceived damage.  
Formalism is an impractical way to fight fraud, however. Justice 
Thomas’s reasoning is deeply disturbing to those who are steeped in the 
ambition of Texas Gulf Sulphur and believe that courts should construe 
securities laws purposively to protect investors from foreseeable harm. 
But, if we bring the doctrinal back-stories into the picture, the Janus 
opinion becomes more readable, if not more satisfying. To the majority, 
text-driven formalism dampens the creative impulses that long ago 
illegitimately turned Rule 10b-5 into a judicial policy-making tool.  
Janus does offer plaintiffs (and maybe the SEC) a suggestion. Justice 
Thomas points to the almost entirely unused Section 20(b), which 
prohibits indirect violations “through or by means of” another person, as a 
possibility for avoiding the worst effects of a narrow construction of 
 
 
 85. See Langevoort, supra note 54, at 2150. 
 86. See supra notes 55–56. 
 87. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 161, 166 (2008). 
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“make.”88 Given that Rule 10b-5 proscribes conduct that is directly or 
indirectly fraudulent and the Court disposed of an argument derived from 
the rule, it is hard to see exactly what this adds to the legal arsenal. 
Moreover, it is far from clear that Section 20(b) would by itself support an 
implied right of action because it only makes conduct unlawful.
89
 But, 
perhaps its statutory pedigree—in no way the product of judicial or 
administrative inventiveness—will invite judges to fold it into the already 
implied right of action under Rule 10b-5.  
C. The Implicit Threat to “In Connection With”  
Although dealing with two very different elements of the cause of 
action, both Janus and Stoneridge say something very similar under the 
facts of those cases: the conduct complained of was sufficiently separate 
and distinct from the “making” of the public misrepresentation such that 
the persons engaged in that conduct were out of the plaintiffs’ reach. As 
stated earlier, reliance is a poor choice for articulating that idea;
90
 “make” 
is no better.  
Conceptually, the instinct behind the demand for something akin to 
proximate causation actually finds its best expression in the “in connection 
with” requirement.91 This requirement has long been seen as doing the 
work of assuring sufficient proximity between the fraud and an investment 
decision. Critics of Janus are deeply disturbed, I suspect, by Justice 
Thomas’s failure (or refusal) to recognize the core claim that JCM created 
a falsity that it placed in a document “reasonably calculated” to influence 
investors. This satisfies all that is usually asked of a securities fraud claim, 
which has been the law since Texas Gulf Sulphur.  
On the other hand, as we have just seen, Texas Gulf Sulphur was a 
horribly wrong turn to deeply conservative judges and commentators, out 
of which grew the distaste for expansive secondary liability. They view 
the decision as the product of an illegitimate effort to create a federal tort 
law by implied right for all those victimized by securities fraud. We have 
 
 
 88. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304 n.10. 
 89. See Thomas H. Burt & Daniel Tepper, Section 20(b): A New Face for Control Person 
Liability, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 29, 2011, available at www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id= 
1202517180339. In their brief and argument, counsel for JCM described Section 20(b) as applicable 
when the behind-the-scenes actor is acting as ventriloquist and the speaker is his dummy. They 
resisted any inference that JIF here was nothing more than a dummy, which is far from obvious given 
the realities of how mutual funds are created and sponsored. 
 90. See Langevoort, supra note 54, at 2133. 
 91. Id.; see also Pritchard, supra note 8, at 132–35. 
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already traced some of that history. Today, however, we are at a point 
where the Court could not easily overrule Texas Gulf Sulphur and return to 
anything akin to a privity requirement, though I suspect that Justice 
Thomas would do so if he could. There is too much case law—Basic Inc. 
v. Levinson
92
 and the entire fraud-on-the-market theory, plus other less 
familiar cases
93—standing in the way, along with implicit statutory 
recognition. The Court has suggested elsewhere that the scope of the 
implied right of action was essentially “frozen” when Congress enacted 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995.
94
 Though generally 
invoked by defense-side lawyers, that suggestion is plaintiff-friendly in so 
far as the converse is also true—that well-established doctrines in effect in 
1995 and not abrogated by legislation are protected from judicial 
elimination. 
The scope of the law could still be redefined, however, and my sense is 
that the more conservative justices on the Court and conservative lower 
court judges are trying to find a way to do just that. If this is right, we 
should not be surprised to see renewed efforts in this direction, armed with 
citations to Janus and Stoneridge. The most likely doctrinal hooks for 
limiting private litigation would be standing, by means of a reinvigoration 
of Blue Chip Stamps,
95
 or maybe a limitation on the scope of “duty.”96 In 
the absence of some element of privity, such as fraud by a purchaser or 
seller of securities, the desired goal would be to limit primary 10b-5 
liability to false filings or false publicity in the name of the issuer—those 
made by the issuer and senior management acting on its behalf, and 
directly for the benefit of its investors.
97
 This revisionism might not seem 
so radical because it preserves Texas Gulf Sulphur and Basic on their facts 
while at the same time restoring a more conservative reading of the “in 
 
 
 92. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 93. E.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006) (preemption 
of state class action because claim was sufficiently “in connection with” the purchase or sale of a 
security, indicating broad reach to the nexus). For a recent survey, see SEC v. Pirate Investor LLC, 
580 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 94. See Stoneridge, 522 U.S. at 165–67. 
 95. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). Cf. Erez Reuveni, 
Extraterritoriality as Standing: A Standing Theory of Extraterritorial Application of the Securities 
Laws, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1071 (2010). 
 96. This is what the district court did in Janus. See In re Mutual Funds Inv. Litig., 487 F. Supp. 
2d 618, 623–24 (D. Md. 2007), rev’d, 566 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub. nom. Janus, 131 S. Ct. 
2296. The court also expressed discomfort with the broad “in connection with” standard. Mutual 
Funds, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 622 n.4. I have argued in favor of a duty approach, albeit one that is more 
expansive than this. See Langevoort, supra note 54, at 2152–56. 
 97. JCM’s brief explicitly offered this reading, saying that only the issuer and its senior 
management can be primarily liable for issuer fraud. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 5, at 14. 
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connection with” requirement short of strict privity. Issuers set the trading 
market in motion by issuing securities originally. Furthermore, issuers 
both repurchase and sell new securities often enough to presume that the 
issuer is a purchaser or seller. And there are ongoing disclosure 
obligations imposed by law that recognize these realities. 
In fact, a skirmish like this erupted a few years ago in the Second 
Circuit, though it was beaten back. In Ontario Public Service Employees v. 
Nortel Networks Corp.,
98
 the Second Circuit held that JD Uniphase 
investors did not have standing to sue Nortel for false filings and publicity 
regarding Nortel’s own financial condition, which indirectly affected JD 
Uniphase because it was one of Nortel’s biggest suppliers. The ruling 
seems entirely inconsistent with a conventional reading of Texas Gulf 
Sulphur. After all, false publicity by Nortel could foreseeably distort the 
market for JD Uniphase stock. Some litigators thus read into the decision 
an implicit limitation that only the issuer itself could be sued for fraud-on-
the-market. A subsequent case, written by then-Judge Sotomayor, said that 
this reading was wrong and that non-issuers could indeed be sued, without 
adequately explaining why Nortel came out as it did.
99
 My sense is that 
Nortel was a step in precisely the conservative direction I have articulated 
and that a Second Circuit panel more aligned with the corrective justice 
framework of Texas Gulf Sulphur prevented it from going any further. 
Another panel or the Supreme Court, however, might have embraced 
rather than dismissed Nortel.  
Were this skirmish to resurface today, Janus would rightly be cited as 
consistent with Nortel, even though they involve entirely different issues. 
Janus essentially holds that misstatements in JIF’s prospectuses are JIF’s 
responsibility alone, and that only the intended beneficiaries of those 
prospectuses have standing to sue because only they are owed an 
enforceable duty. Whether one agrees or disagrees with that outcome, the 
analysis is intellectually coherent in a way that the articulated logic of 
Janus is not. While I hope that a relatively broad scope to the “in 
connection with” requirement and the ancillary issues of duty and standing 
will be preserved, I suspect that Janus will encourage a more aggressive 
attack on what, to so many, seems to be received wisdom, precisely 
because Janus’s reasoning is so out of sync with Texas Gulf Sulphur.  
 
 
 98. 369 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 99. In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 2007); see also In re Salomon 
Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 481 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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III. JANUS APPLIED: THE WAY FORWARD 
Janus is deeply conservative, in a way profoundly different from the 
instrumental preference for private ordering and regulatory competition 
found in conventional law and economics analysis. Both kinds of 
conservatism resonate with a majority of the current Supreme Court, but it 
is important to understand the duality and not to confuse one kind of 
conservative impulse with the other. 
Other justices on the Supreme Court and judges in the lower courts, 
however, have different ideologies and preferences. And a judge inclined 
toward one or both conservative impulses might still have views that play 
out differently based on the facts before them.
100
 Thus, we cannot say that 
Janus’s deep conservatism will necessarily hold as similar issues are 
decided in future cases, mainly by lower courts. Many Supreme Court 
decisions are implicitly revised or superseded—the law of insider trading 
from Chiarella to O’Hagan notably illustrates a gradual change in 
doctrine toward liberalization.
101
 We should not extrapolate too hurriedly, 
then, either out of hope or fear. In this light, the following sections 
consider a number of questions left open by Janus. 
A. SEC Enforcement 
For the reasons discussed in Part I, the applicability of Janus to SEC 
enforcement actions (and criminal prosecutions) is far more debatable than 
currently assumed. How much this matters, given the SEC’s other 
statutory remedies and ability to revise its own rule, is not clear. It might 
be better for private plaintiffs if the SEC continues to be held to Janus in 
10b-5 cases, because courts will be less likely to extend the holding 
mindlessly in the public enforcement context. As we are already beginning 
to see, more cases involving the SEC rather than fraud-on-the-market 
plaintiffs will probably push the case law toward a more moderate 
equilibrium.  
Assuming otherwise, the most direct way for the SEC to avoid Janus is 
to bring its cases wherever possible under Section 17(a) of the Securities 
 
 
 100. This includes a relative lack of interest in the intricacies of the securities markets and hence 
fairly superficial thinking about them. G. Mitu Gulati & Stephen M. Bainbridge, How Do Judges 
Maximize? (The Same Way Everybody Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud 
Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83 (2002); Pritchard, supra note 8, at 116. 
 101. See Donald C. Langevoort, Words from on High About Rule 10b-5: Chiarella’s History, 
Central Bank’s Future, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865 (1995). 
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Act,
102
 rather than Rule 10b-5, because the statute does not use the word 
“make” but otherwise operates as a broad antifraud standard with respect 
to the offer or sale of a security. There is no private right of action under 
Section 17(a), so the concerns about private liability have no application 
here.  
Defendants in SEC enforcement actions have argued that Janus’ 
“ultimate authority” test implicitly confines the scope of Section 17(a) as 
well as 10b-5, and at least one court has agreed.
103
 That is nonsense. 
Statutory language has to be interpreted literally, and the relevant language 
in Section 17(a) asks whether the defendant obtained money or property 
“by means of” a materially false or misleading statement or omission.104 
None of the Janus Court’s references to the dictionary, speechwriters, or 
precedent concerning the need to confine judicially-implied private rights 
of action are the least bit helpful for interpreting words written a decade 
before Rule 10b-5 came into existence. As we have seen, a reasonable 
application of Section 17(a)’s text to JCM’s conduct would most plausibly 
lead to the conclusion that JCM did violate the statute, since it obtained 
inflated management fees by misstating its late-trading policy in JIF’s 
prospectuses. It turns textualist statutory construction on its head to say 
that because the word “make” in a later-adopted administrative rule has a 
narrow formalistic meaning, Congress’s earlier and different language in 
Section 17(a) must be similarly restricted. 
B. Disclosure Filings 
Janus says that the issuer or other person who has the legal 
responsibility and authority to file a document with the SEC is the maker 
of the statements contained therein.
105
 Attorneys, advisers, and other third 
parties who act behind the scenes to create the disclosure are not 
 
 
 102. 15 U.S.C. § 778 (2006). 
 103. Compare SEC v. Daifotis, No. C 11-00137 WHA, 2011 WL 3295139, at *5–6 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 1, 2011) (Janus does not apply), and SEC v. Stoker, No. 11 Civ. 7388 JSR, 2012 WL 2017736, 
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2012) (same), with SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 345–46 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (Janus applies). Section 17(a) is a particularly important tool that can reach both intentional and 
negligent forms of deception. In a pre-Janus case that uses a similarly narrow definition of “make” in 
Rule 10b-5, the court stresses that Section 17(a) is entirely different and broader. Tambone, 597 F.3d 
at 444–45. 
 104. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2). 
 105. See Reese v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 643 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2011) (party to a contract 
not liable for contractual representations when the contract was filed with the SEC by another entity). 
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“makers”—even if, as in Janus, their participation in the drafting could be 
inferred by a reasonable investor.
106
  
Issuer insiders pose a much harder problem. Even the defendants in 
Janus pretty much conceded that an issuer’s senior managers cannot be 
treated as secondary actors in a corporate fraud that they perpetrated. After 
Sarbanes-Oxley, moreover, the CEO and CFO must certify 10-Ks and 
10-Qs at the time of filing.
107
 Nonetheless, defendants have invoked Janus 
to argue that the issuer is technically the only person with ultimate legal 
authority over the filing itself, and to say that certification should be 
enforceable by the government alone because it is simply a device to 
produce greater top-down attentiveness to reporting and internal controls. 
This is especially true, they continue, in the context of a statute like 
Sarbanes-Oxley, where Congress studiously avoided creating increased 
private liability as a solution to the financial misreporting problem. In 
response, the best argument in favor of primary liability is that 
certification is meant as a powerful form of public attribution, and there is 
some evidence that investors find the certifications themselves 
informative.
108
 So far, plaintiffs are winning this debate. The early post-
Janus case law tends to preserve exposure for the company’s highest 
executives with respect to issuer filings, assuming sufficient attribution.
109
 
Explicit attribution typically disappears as we move down the 
corporate hierarchy, however, and so it becomes harder to declare the 
deceptive actions of, say, a vice president to be a violation of Rule 10b-5. 
 
 
 106. This is the key distinction between Janus and the “attribution” standard that had prevailed in 
a number of courts of appeals. The Fourth Circuit decision reversed by the Supreme Court had 
essentially conceded application of that rule but said that a reasonable investor could reasonably 
understand the involvement of the adviser in the marketing of the fund to be an implicit attribution. 
Mutual Funds, 566 F.3d at 126–27. But see Tambone, 597 F.3d 436 (rejecting such an approach as 
applied to the underwriter of mutual fund shares). For all practical purposes, Janus creates a formalist 
application of an attribution standard. 
 107. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., supra note 17, at 373–74. 
 108. Compare Paul Griffin & David Lont, Taking the Oath: Investor Response to SEC 
Certification Under Sarbanes-Oxley, 1 CONTEMP. J. ACCT. & ECON. 27 (2005), with Utpal 
Bhattacharya et al., Is CEO Certification of Earnings Numbers Value-Relevant?, 14 J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 
611 (2007). On the motivation for certification, see generally Lisa M. Fairfax, Form Over Substance?: 
Officer Certification and the Promise of Enhanced Personal Accountability Under the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (2002). 
 109. See City of St. Clair Shores Gen. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Lender Processing Servs., Inc., No. 
3:10-CV-1073-J-32JBT, 2012 WL 1080953 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2012); In re Merck & Co. Sec., Deriv. 
& ERISA Litig., No. MDL No. 1658 (SRC), 2011 WL 3444199 (D.N.J. Aug. 8, 2011); Local 703 I.B. 
of T. Grocery & Food Employees’ Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp., No. CV:10-2847-IPJ, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93873 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 23, 2011); SEC v. Daifotis, No. C11-00137 WHA, 2011 WL 
3295139 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011); SEC v. Das, No. 8:10CV102, 2011 WL 4375787 (D. Neb. Sept. 
20, 2011). 
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Indeed, attribution was difficult here even before Janus in courts that 
applied a strict version of the bright-line attribution standard.
110
 Janus 
exacerbates the difficulty in reaching lower-level participants by 
emphasizing that ultimate authority typically involves attribution. We can, 
of course, ask why this should be of much concern. Private class actions 
rarely focus on non-trading individual defendants below the CEO/CFO 
level. This is an important area for the SEC to police, but it has additional 
tools like aiding and abetting, cease and desist, Rule 13b2-1, Rule 13b2-2, 
and perhaps Section 17(a) of the Securities Act that make reliance on Rule 
10b-5 less important. True, the SEC does have the ability to seek more 
severe penalties when fraud is demonstrated, but even then it is not clear 
that Rule 10b-5 is the only route to proving fraud.
 
 
My sense is that both the SEC and private plaintiffs should give more 
thought to an alternative theory of indirect fraud. Nothing in Janus rules 
out what the Solicitor General’s impeccably conservative brief in 
Stoneridge claimed: that persons engage in a deceptive act or practice 
within the strict textual meaning of Section 10(b) where the false 
statement is directed at an issuer’s audit, internal controls, or disclosure 
system. The brief does not take a position of whether such deception was 
in connection with a purchase or sale. But, unless there is a radical 
reorientation of that requirement, deception specifically intended to game 
the public disclosure system should suffice for liability.
111
 A reliance 
inquiry would follow in a private action, but as I suggested earlier, there 
are many cases where the nexus between the fraud and the reliance is 
significantly less remote or attenuated than that in Stoneridge. 
This is also one place where Section 20(b) might aid plaintiffs, though 
the statutory language is very opaque. It addresses using other persons as 
conduits for a violation,
112
 something that works well enough when 
 
 
 110. See SEC v. Lucent Techs., Inc. 610 F. Supp. 2d 342 (D.N.J. 2009). Post-Janus, see Hawaii 
Ironworkers Annuity Trust Fund v. Cole, No. 3:10CV371, 2011 WL 3862206, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 
1, 2011) (no liability for officers acting under pressure from top management because they did not bear 
ultimate responsibility for the filings). All this assumes no attribution. With sufficient attribution, even 
third parties can take on “maker” responsibility, as in the case where the filing states that a third party 
has provided the information being disclosed. See Lopes v. Viera, No. 1:05-CV-01243 JLT, 2012 WL 
691665 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2012). For a case that takes this idea quite far with respect to insiders, see 
Red River Resources Inc. v. Mariner Sys. Inc., No. CV 11-02589-PHX-FJM, 2012 WL 2507517, at *6 
(D. Ariz. June 29, 2012) (review and preparation of disclosure by chief technology officer sufficient 
based on “implied attribution”). But see SEC v. Wolfson, 539 F.3d 1249, 1259–60 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(declining to apply attribution standard pre-Janus in SEC enforcement cases). 
 111. See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text.  
 112. Section 20(b) makes it unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, “to do any act or thing 
which would be unlawful for such person to do . . . through or by means of any other person.” 15 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
958 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:933 
 
 
 
 
misinformation is disseminated through an innocent intermediary. On the 
other hand, a false filing is not something any person but the issuer has the 
authority to make, so it is hardly clear that the executive is doing 
something through or by means of the issuer that he or she is prohibited 
from doing directly. The important point, however, is that this is statutory 
language and is therefore not subject to the kind of strict interpretation 
designed to frustrate judicial or administrative creativity. We might expect 
to see reasonably expansive applications of this language, even from more 
conservative judges.
113
  
Section 20(a) is another obvious possibility for plaintiffs to consider 
invoking against senior executives. Executives deemed to be “controlling 
persons” become liable for violations of a controlled person unless they 
acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce that 
violation.
114
 The term “controlling person” has long been interpreted in 
terms of substance over form—looking to practical power rather than 
formal authority. The voluminous case law on Section 20(a) is not entirely 
consistent, particularly with regard to the good faith/no inducement 
defense. A full-scale restatement of this body of law is beyond the scope 
of this Essay, but we need not assume that faithfully conservative judges 
will read the statutory text of Section 20(a) in an unduly narrow fashion. 
These interpretive issues aside, however, Section 20(a) has a big 
stumbling block: there must be a primary violation before controlling 
person liability even becomes an issue. That brings us back to the lies 
without liars problem. With a practical construction of “control,” one 
might reasonably argue that JCM and JCG were controlling persons vis-à-
vis JIF. But it would not matter unless JIF violated Rule 10b-5. 
 
 
U.S.C. § 78t(b) (2006). As noted earlier, the fact that this provision makes no reference to private 
liability might raise doubts as to whether it can be invoked in private litigation. 
 113. In Janus, the Court does obliquely take note of cases where an issuer’s management misleads 
securities analysts, who incorporate the lies into their forecasts and recommendations, though the most 
specific reference is where the issuer then touts those forecasts. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304 n.9 (citing In 
re Aetna Inc. Sec. Litig., 617 F.3d 272, 275–77 (3d Cir. 2010)). For a case that picks up on this idea to 
create liability at least where the speaker specifically intends for the statements to be repeated, see SEC 
v. Daifotis, No. C11-00137 WHA, 2012 WL 2132389, at *8 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2012) (“The Court is 
persuaded that in the wake of Janus, an executive who undisputably exercised authority over his non-
casual statements with the intent and reasonable expectation that such statement would be relayed to 
the investing public, should be deemed to be the person who ‘made’ the statements to the investing 
public (so long as it is proven that the statement was made to the investing public).”). Janus also 
leaves open the possible use of Section 20(b) where misleading information is routed through an 
innocent intermediary, which certainly might describe what happened in the case. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 
2304 n.10; see also id. at 2310–11 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting that, if so, the case should be 
remanded). 
 114. See COX ET AL., supra note 17, at 773–81.  
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That, in turn, takes us to one of the greatly under-theorized subjects in 
all of securities litigation: corporate scienter. As the entity with ultimate 
legal authority over its prospectuses, JIF plainly made the material 
misrepresentations on which plaintiffs supposedly relied. The scienter 
requirement is what stands most immediately in the way of JIF’s liability. 
Obviously, entities cannot think or sense, so corporate scienter necessarily 
comes by attribution from the awareness of the entity’s agents and 
employees.
115
 The idea often invoked here is respondeat superior, which 
should immediately draw suspicion in this context. Fischel included 
respondeat superior in his list of the three doctrines that must be jettisoned 
in a faithfully conservative reading of Section 10(b),
116
 and the dissent in 
Central Bank acknowledged that it was at risk under the majority’s 
reasoning.  
But the hyper-textualist Fischel missed something. Section 10(b) 
confers rulemaking authority to bar “any person” from engaging in 
manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances. The word “person” has 
been defined by statute since 1975 to included corporate entities as well as 
natural persons. So, Congress must have contemplated the possibility of 
corporate scienter. Some form of attribution, in turn, is essential to carry 
out this statutory directive.
117
 That corporate scienter has survived 
untouched long after Central Bank is an indication that the courts 
appreciate that it is an essential weight-bearing beam in the structure of the 
statute’s antifraud prohibition. 
Even with this appreciation, however, corporate scienter has never 
been coherently articulated. There is case law to support at least three 
variations of what must be shown: (1) that the speaker himself on behalf of 
the corporation must have been aware of the truth, or recklessly 
disregarded it; (2) that some other corporate agent knew or recklessly 
disregarded the truth, even if the speaker was entirely innocent; or (3) that 
knowledge of multiple corporate actors can be attributed to the 
corporation, even if no single agent within the firm knew the truth.
118
  
 
 
 115. See, e.g., Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, 
J.). 
 116. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 117. See Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 182 n.8 (3d Cir. 1981); In re Centennial 
Technologies Litig., 52 F. Supp. 2d 178 (D. Mass. 1999). For my elaboration on these issues, see 
Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor and Knowledge, 71 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1227–29 (2003). 
 118. See Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales Olazábal, The Locus of Corporate Scienter, 2006 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 81; Langevoort, supra note 117. 
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The third of these variations has relatively little direct support in the 
10b-5 case law,
119
 though there is precedent for drawing inferences from 
information likely to be in the hands of officials connected to the firm’s 
core operations on the conceptually separate question of what plaintiffs 
have to plead about corporate scienter to survive a motion to dismiss.
120
 
The first two definitions of corporate scienter are more authoritative, and 
actually blend together. When an entity is the defendant, who is the 
speaker? Assuming that corporate filings and publicity are a group effort, 
then there can be more than one “speaker” for knowledge purposes. And, 
further assuming that recklessness suffices for scienter, those participants 
can act with the requisite intent by willfully disregarding the likelihood 
that someone else knows the truth. So it is not surprising that the most 
common articulation of the corporate scienter principle is actually a hybrid 
that looks “to the state of mind of the individual corporate official or 
officials who make or issue the statement (or order or approve it or its 
making or issuance, or who furnish information or language for inclusion 
therein, or the like) . . . .”121  
We need not resolve the precise articulation of the standard here, 
because Janus says nothing about this with respect to entirely intra-
corporate matters. It is enough to emphasize the necessity of an attribution 
principle, without regard to whether the person whose knowledge is being 
attributed is also a “maker” of the misstatement,122 if any serious notion of 
corporate personhood is to work.
123
  
 
 
 119. For a critique, see Bradley J. Bondi, Dangerous Liaisons: Collective Scienter in SEC 
Enforcement Actions, 6 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1 (2009). 
 120. See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Messy Mental Markers: Inferring Scienter 
from Core Operations in Securities Fraud Litigation, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 507, 525–26 (2012). 
 121. Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th Cir. 2004); 
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 513 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2007). Bondi, supra note 119, 
provides a good overview of the case law. 
 122. See Kerr v. Exobox Technologies Corp., No. CIV. A. H-10-4221, 2012 WL 201872 at *14–
15 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2012) (attributing knowledge of the majority owner who was heavily involved 
in the preparation of the offering materials, even though such person was not the “maker” under 
Janus). 
 123. John Coffee raises the interesting question of whether JIF might be deemed to know of 
JCM’s faithlessness, either by attribution, knowledge, or awareness of certain of its directors, thereby 
making it the party primarily liable and JCM and JCG then exposed as controlling persons. See John 
C. Coffee, Jr., U.S. Supreme Court and Securities Litigation, N.Y. L.J., July 21, 2011, available at 
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202503787586. While one might find a 
way of manipulating agency law to impose knowledge, I cannot imagine any court being inclined to do 
so when the result would be giving investors in JCG the ability to impose liability on JIF and its 
shareholders, who were the victims of JCG’s alleged wrongdoing. The Brief filed by the Solicitor 
General in Janus explicitly assumes that there could be no scienter on the part of JIF. See Brief, supra 
note 55, at 24–25. On the limits of using agency law attribution principles to find scienter, see 
Langevoort, supra note 117, at 1228–30. 
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C. Corporate Separateness 
There remains the question of where to draw this line in terms of 
corporate separateness—i.e., where knowledge of the truth resides outside 
the formal boundaries of the firm. Presumably, Janus leaves room to 
disregard such separateness in the relatively rare situations where veil 
piercing would be warranted.
124
 A much harder question is whether 
separateness exists in the parent-subsidiary context, where the parent is the 
issuer but day-to-day business operations are all carried out through 
wholly-owned subsidiaries with due respect for corporate formalities. One 
notable Seventh Circuit decision found the parent not liable under Rule 
10b-5 for false disclosures caused by the subsidiary’s CEO. The court then 
absolved the CEO as well, based on reasoning that anticipated Janus in 
many respects.
125
 I, however, suspect that other courts may see this 
differently when plaintiffs raise corporate scienter questions in the context 
of a single-business enterprise, regardless of whether there is formal 
separation among business units. Where financial reporting 
responsibilities cross unit lines—as they must under the post-Sarbanes-
Oxley internal controls regime—it is hard to justify thinking of the issuer’s 
knowledge or awareness in purely formalistic terms, as Janus does, by 
stopping abruptly at the legal boundary of the issuer.
126
  
Still, if we connect Janus to the recently primed faith in the sanctity of 
corporate personhood in other decisions of the Court, the opinion becomes 
more understandable, if not more persuasive. The high-visibility Citizens 
United case is only the most recent outside the securities area where the 
Supreme Court has embraced an old-fashioned vision of the corporation as 
 
 
 124. See In re Optimal U.S. Litig., No. 10 CIV 4095 SAS, 2011 WL 4908745 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 
2011) (no justification for veil piercing under the facts). Optimal applies Janus with respect to the 
parent company’s alleged primary liability where its subsidiary made the false filing, holding that 
Section 20(a) is the only way to reach the parent in that situation. Id. at *4–5. For a case coming out 
the other way on whether a parent bears “maker” responsibility for its subsidiary’s falsities, see City of 
Roseville Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. EnergySolutions, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 2d 395, 417–18 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011). Roseville emphasized that the parent’s dominance was clearly communicated to investors in the 
prospectus, so that treating parent and subsidiary as separate entities made no sense. Id.; see also In re 
Allstate Life Ins. Co. Litig., No. CV 09-8162-PCT-GMS, 2012 WL 1900560 (D. Ariz. May 24, 2012) 
(controlling entity’s name “featured prominently” in disclosures). 
 125. See Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 2008).  
 126. Financial reporting responsibilities under the SEC’s extensive rules are thoroughly anti-
formalistic, including consolidated reporting for affiliates and a definition of “executive officer” of the 
issuer that can take in managers at the subsidiary level. 17 C.F.R. § 240.36–7. For a case rejecting 
Janus in the parent-subsidiary context as helpful with respect to New York antifraud law, see Allstate 
Insurance Inc. v. Countrywide Financial Corp., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 
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a real entity.
127
 The Court’s embrace of this formalist vision of the 
corporation is ironic because it implies that there are distinct legal 
boundaries deserving of respect. Instrumentalist conservatives actually 
tend to contest the formalist vision of the corporation in favor of the 
familiar “nexus of contracts” in which these boundaries are highly 
negotiable.
128
 But Janus at least sets a default here. The decision suggests 
that the legislative choice to speak of corporate liability implies the 
adoption of an orthodox meaning for corporate personhood. Hence, the 
traditional, simplistic legal boundaries should stand unless and until 
Congress is willing to address corporate liability—and investor protection 
generally—in a clearer and more comprehensive way. For better or worse, 
that may be the main point Justice Thomas made in Janus, and will 
probably not be the last word to that effect. 
D. Informal Publicity 
Fraud-on-the-market litigation often targets allegedly misleading 
corporate publicity—interviews in the press, conference calls with 
analysts, etc.—rather than formal SEC filings. Janus does not fit squarely 
into this setting because it is hard to determine who has “ultimate 
responsibility” for making informal disclosures. The post-Janus case law 
has largely taken the position that the “makers” of informal publicity are 
the corporate managers who initiate the publicity as well as the issuer on 
whose behalf they are acting. In other words, lower courts have 
distinguished Janus as being inapplicable to actions by the issuer’s own 
internal managers, as opposed to a distinct outside entity like JCM vis-à-
vis JIF.
129
  
 
 
 127. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). There has been an outpouring of commentary 
on the corporate law assumptions underlying the strong grant of First Amendment protection to 
corporations, including assumptions that suggest a superficial impression of corporate personhood. 
E.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 999; Anne 
Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and Corporate Personhood 
in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 495 (2011). For an article connecting Janus and Citizens 
United, see Virginia Harper Ho, Theories of Corporate Groups: Corporate Identity Reconceived, 42 
SETON HALL L. REV. 879, 927–32, 943–45 (2012). This formalism in imagining the corporate entity is 
not entirely new. In United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998), for instance, the Court wrote in an 
environmental law case that “[i]t is a general principle of corporate law deeply ‘ingrained in our 
economic and legal systems’ that a parent corporation . . . is not liable for the acts of its subsidiaries,” 
thereby limiting derivative liability to veil-piercing situations. Id. at 61. 
 128. E.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 10. 
 129. See Merck & Co. Sec., Deriv. & ERISA Litig., 2011 WL 3444199, at 24–26 (D.N.J. 2011); 
SEC v. Carter, No. 10 C 6145, 2011 WL 5980966, at *1–3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 2011). In Fulton County 
Employees’ Ret. System v. MGIC Investment Corp., 675 F.3d 1047 (7th Cir. 2012), the court 
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To be sure, this is an uneasy distinction. If we see corporations in the 
instrumentally conservative fashion as a nexus of contracts,
130
 it is hardly 
obvious that the contractual relationship with the internal agent is 
conceptually different from the contractual relationship with an external 
investment adviser. But taking the idea of a distinctive corporate 
personhood seriously does necessitate that we identify certain actors who 
are empowered to give life to the firm. So, it is intuitive to treat the senior 
management team as speaking both as and for the issuer in terms of day-
to-day corporate publicity. There may be cases where informal publicity is 
initiated by an insider speaking personally and not in her official capacity 
on behalf of the firm, in which case the outcome might well be different. 
But, both senior management and the issuer are properly named as 
defendants when management assumes the role of “maker” on behalf of 
the issuer. This is the case for the kinds of publicity most often invoked by 
plaintiffs in securities litigation, such as press releases and scripted 
conference calls.  
E. Scheme Liability 
To this point, we have not addressed another fairly obvious way of 
distinguishing Janus in both SEC and private lawsuits. Justice Thomas 
concentrates on a single word—“make”—which appears in only one of 
three distinct subparts of Rule 10b-5. The other two subparts use the verbs 
“engage” and “employ.” So maybe the opinion says nothing about Rule 
10b-5 generally, which would encourage plaintiffs to restructure their 
complaints to allege schemes to defraud or deceptive acts and practices 
rather than misrepresentations or omissions.  
It cannot be that simple, though. If one goes through Justice Thomas’s 
argument from the dictionary reference through the precedential 
progression, it is hard to find much about “make” that cannot be said about 
“engage” or “employ.” Even before Janus, courts had become sensitive to 
the temptation to invoke something akin to scheme liability to re-litigate 
issues foreclosed under a straightforward misrepresentation claim.
131
 
 
 
interpreted Janus so that the issuer hosting an analyst conference call was not deemed to “make” 
statements by the executives of an affiliated (but not controlled) entity who were invited to participate. 
 130. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 127. 
 131. See WPP Luxembourg Gamma Three SARL v. Spot Runner, Inc., 655 F.3d 1039, 1057–58 
(9th Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2713 (2012); Lentell v. Merrill Lynch, 396 F.3d 161, 177 (2d 
Cir. 2005) (loss causation). For a case applying Janus but concluding that the SEC’s complaint 
legitimately raised claims under subsections (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5, see SEC v. Mercury Interactive, 
LLC, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 96,604 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2011) (options backdating scheme). 
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These courts hold that complaints about misrepresentations or half-
truths—as most securities cases are—must be treated as such, no matter 
which prong of the rule is invoked. This issue is another place where 
Janus makes much more sense as addressing only the contours of the 
implied private right of action under Rule 10b-5, because that now is 
essentially an exercise in policy-driven restraint.
132
  
IV. CONCLUSION 
One of the most quoted phrases in the jurisprudence of securities 
litigation is the idea that the antifraud prohibitions of the securities laws 
should be read flexibly, not technically or restrictively.
133
 Yet Janus 
presents just the opposite: a rule of construction that insists on restricting a 
text that was meant by its drafters to pragmatically extend the prohibition 
against securities fraud. This outcome seems incomprehensible to those 
with any reasonably progressive vision of the administrative state, and this 
makes it easy to dismiss the Court’s opinion with little more than a sad 
shake of the head. 
A majority of the Court now seems convinced that the relative inability 
of the plaintiffs’ bar to gain more from Congress in terms of enhanced 
liability (particularly secondary liability) over the last two decades should 
be respected as a political outcome not to be frustrated by judicial 
flexibility to promote a bastard doctrine from an earlier era. That 
inference, however, relates only to private securities litigation. Unless 
Janus is read to be just about private litigation, as I have suggested, its 
legacy will be an unnecessarily cribbed reading of Rule 10b-5 as collateral 
damage from the battle over securities class actions, leaving an 
inexplicable and unfortunate residuum of lies without liars.  
 
 
 132. For a case so applying Janus, see SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 343–45 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011). See also SEC v. Pentagon Capital Mgmt. PLC, 844 F. Supp. 2d 377 (S.D.N.Y 2012) (involving 
late-trading claims under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), and Section 17(a)). 
 133. The phrase originates with SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 
(1963). Adam Pritchard makes the case that this phrase has been in demise for a while, though it still 
makes occasional appearances. See A.C. Pritchard, Launching the Insider Trading Revolution: SEC v. 
Capital Gains Research Bureau, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF INSIDER 
TRADING (forthcoming) (Steven Bainbridge ed., 2012). 
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